<?xml version="1.1" encoding="utf-8"?>
<article xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://jats.nlm.nih.gov/publishing/1.1/xsd/JATS-journalpublishing1-mathml3.xsd" dtd-version="1.1" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">PBES</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title>Proceedings of Business and Economic Studies</journal-title></journal-title-group><issn>2209-2641</issn><eissn>2209-265X</eissn><publisher><publisher-name>Bio-Byword Scientific Publishing Pty. Ltd.</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.26689/PBES.v9i10.16184</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Article</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title>Market Response to ICVCM Methodology Decisions in the Voluntary Carbon Market</title><url>https://artdesignp.com/journal/PBES/9/10/10.26689/PBES.v9i10.16184</url><author>ZhangYiming</author><pub-date pub-type="publication-year"><year>2026</year></pub-date><volume>9</volume><issue>10</issue><history><date date-type="pub"><published-time>2026-11-16</published-time></date></history><abstract>The Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market was created to identify carbon credits that meet a common threshold for integrity, but a governance determination matters economically only if buyers alter their behavior in response. This article tests whether the Integrity Council&amp;rsquo;s 2024 methodology decisions changed revealed demand, measured by project-level credit retirements. It combines the Integrity Council&amp;rsquo;s dated decisions with the Berkeley Voluntary Registry Offsets Database, which covers 11,468 projects across six registries and reports annual issuance and retirement histories. The principal analysis examines 1,448 renewable-energy projects and 9,833 project-years from 2018 through 2025. Projects using one of eight methodologies that the Integrity Council rejected in August 2024 are compared with other renewable-energy projects in the same overlapping project types. Models include project fixed effects, project-type-by-year effects, registry-by-year effects, available credit supply, and methodology-clustered standard errors. Contrary to the predicted demand penalty, rejected methodologies show no detectable decline in 2025 retirement intensity or in the probability of recording a retirement. The preferred estimates are 0.019 (standard error 0.288) for inverse-hyperbolic-sine retirements and 0.048 (standard error 0.041) for the retirement probability. Both estimates are imprecise but inconsistent with an immediate, clearly visible negative market response. Results remain similar in a balanced panel, a single-methodology sample, a shorter event window, and specifications without the supply control. A separate comparison of approved ozone-depleting-substance methodologies is too small and has nonparallel pre-trends, so it is reported descriptively rather than interpreted causally. The findings do not show that integrity labels lack value. They show that external governance judgments did not automatically translate into near-term retirement reallocation. This result provides a first large-sample test of buyer demand as a governance condition and identifies the public data needed to evaluate integrity reforms more conclusively.</abstract><keywords>Voluntary carbon market, Carbon credits, ICVCM, Certification, Credit retirements, Private governance, Market integrity</keywords></article-meta></front><body/><back><ref-list><ref id="B1" content-type="article"><label>1</label><element-citation publication-type="journal"><p>[1] Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market, 2024, Integrity Council Announces First High-Integrity CCP-Labelled Carbon Credits, as Assessments Continue. 6 June. https://icvcm.org/integrity-council-announces-first-high-integrity-ccp-labelled-carbon-credits-as-assessments-continue/
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