SSRScientific and Social Research2661-43322981-9946Bio-Byword Scientific Publishing Pty. Ltd.10.26689/ssr.v7i12.13384ArticleAutonomous Weapon Systems and Individual Criminal Liability under the Rome Statutehttps://artdesignp.com/journal/SSR/7/12/10.26689/ssr.v7i12.13384TongZhaohang20257122025-12-31Autonomous weapon systems (AWS) pose significant challenges for individual criminal responsibility under the Rome Statute. While existing modes of liability—such as perpetration, ordering, aiding and abetting, and command responsibility—can theoretically apply to AWS-related crimes, their effectiveness depends on human intent and control. When autonomous systems act unpredictably, attribution of the actus reus, mens rea, and causation becomes uncertain, creating a “responsibility gap” in which no human perpetrator can be clearly identified. This paper evaluates how the International Criminal Court could adapt existing doctrines to address this gap, including broader interpretations of perpetration-by-means, omission liability, and expanded command responsibility. It also assesses proposals for new offences, prosecutorial guidelines, and non-criminal accountability mechanisms. The analysis argues that legal innovation is essential to ensure that accountability remains human-centred as warfare becomes increasingly automated.

Human Rights Watch, 2015, Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic. Mind the Gap: The Lack of Accountability for Killer Robots. New York: Human Rights Watch: 12–14.

Docherty B L, 2012, Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots[R]. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Crootof R, 2016, War torts: accountability for autonomous weapons. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 164(6): 1347–1402.

Matthias A, 2004, The responsibility gap: ascribing responsibility for the actions of learning automata. Ethics and Information Technology, 6(3): 175–183.

Chengeta T, 2016, Accountability gap: autonomous weapon systems and modes of responsibility in international law. Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 45(1): 1–52.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, 2187 UNTS 90.

Schmitt M N, 2015, Autonomous weapon systems and international humanitarian law: a reply to the critics. Harvard National Security Journal, 6: 1–36.

Boothby W H, 2016, Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 270–276.

Asaro P, 2012, On banning autonomous weapon systems: human rights, automation, and the dehumanization of lethal decision-making. International Review of the Red Cross, 94(886): 687–709.

Sassòli M, 2019, International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar: 417–420.

Werle G, Jessberger F, 2020, Principles of International Criminal Law. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 178–186.

Jain N, 2011, The control theory of perpetration in international criminal law. Chicago Journal of International Law, 12(1): 159–199.

Ambos K, 2021, Article 25: individual criminal responsibility//Triffterer O, Ambos K (eds). The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary. 4th ed. München; Oxford: Beck; Hart: 1250–1253.

Block J, 2023, Responsibility for ordering under Article 25(3)(b) of the Rome Statute//Olásolo H (ed). Reconciling Responsibility with Reality: A Comparative Analysis of Modes of Active Leadership Liability in International Criminal Law. The Hague: TMC Asser Press: 367–411.

Öztürk O, 2021, Does the purpose clause of Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute cause impunity?. Australian International Law Journal, 28: 145–166.

Werle G, 2007, Individual criminal responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 5(5): 951–969.

Prosecutor V T, 1999, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 185–226.

Ambos K, 2007, Joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 5(2): 159–183.

Spadaro A, 2023, A weapon is no subordinate: autonomous weapons and the scope of superior responsibility. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 21(5): 1119–1144.

Gaeta P, 2024, Who acts when autonomous weapons strike? The act requirement for individual criminal responsibility and state responsibility. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 21(5): 1033–1054.

Devitt S K, 2023, Meaningful human command: advance control directives as a method to enable moral and legal responsibility for autonomous weapon systems. arXiv pre-print: 1–25.

Duttwiler M, 2006, Liability for omission in international criminal law. International Criminal Law Review, 6(1): 35–57.

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1977, 1125 UNTS 3-06-08.

Prosecutor v Delalić (Čelebići Case) (Trial Chamber Judgment). International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 1998, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 333-346.

Prosecutor V K, Ruzindana (Trial Chamber Judgment), 1999, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 199-201.

Caton J L, 2015, Autonomous Weapon Systems: A Brief Survey of Developmental, Operational, Legal, and Ethical Issues. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College: 23.

Ambos K, 2013, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol. I: Foundations and General Part. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 297–299.

Cryer R, Friman H, Robinson D, 2019, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure. 4th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 3–5.