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<article xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://jats.nlm.nih.gov/publishing/1.1/xsd/JATS-journalpublishing1-mathml3.xsd" dtd-version="1.1" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">SSR</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title>Scientific and Social Research</journal-title></journal-title-group><issn>2661-4332</issn><eissn>2981-9946</eissn><publisher><publisher-name>Bio-Byword Scientific Publishing Pty. Ltd.</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.26689/ssr.v7i4.10470</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Article</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title>From the Perspectives of Legal Positivism, Natural Law, and Legal Liberalism, Respectively, What are the Different Understandings and Positions on the Legal Personhood of AI?</title><url>https://artdesignp.com/journal/SSR/7/4/10.26689/ssr.v7i4.10470</url><author>LiZiyi</author><pub-date pub-type="publication-year"><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>7</volume><issue>4</issue><history><date date-type="pub"><published-time>2025-05-02</published-time></date></history><abstract>With the development of artificial intelligence (AI), conflicts over the social function of AI arise. This article will be dedicated to the discussion of the probability and necessity of recognizing the legal personhood of AI through the lenses of three major jurisprudential schools: legal positivism, natural law, and legal liberalism. The goal is to find out the possible path of the legal positioning of AI to maximize the benefits of AI use. Therefore, this essay can serve as a theoretical review of the advantages and disadvantages of acknowledging AI’s legal personhood. The essay first discusses the central logic of three major jurisprudential schools, as well as the current studies on AI’s role in the legal field. Then, AI is put under the lens of these jurisprudential schools. 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