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<article xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://jats.nlm.nih.gov/publishing/1.1/xsd/JATS-journalpublishing1-mathml3.xsd" dtd-version="1.1" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">SSR</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title>Scientific and Social Research</journal-title></journal-title-group><issn>2661-4332</issn><eissn>2981-9946</eissn><publisher><publisher-name>Bio-Byword Scientific Publishing Pty. Ltd.</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.26689/ssr.v7i6.11083</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Article</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title>From Guardians to Liabilities: Rethinking Gatekeeper Accountability in Securities Regulation</title><url>https://artdesignp.com/journal/SSR/7/6/10.26689/ssr.v7i6.11083</url><author>ZhangWenhui</author><pub-date pub-type="publication-year"><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>7</volume><issue>6</issue><history><date date-type="pub"><published-time>2025-06-13</published-time></date></history><abstract>This article examines the ongoing trust crisis facing gatekeepers in the securities markets, including credit rating agencies, auditors, and underwriters. Drawing on prominent case studies such as the 2008 subprime crisis and the Luckin Coffee fraud, it argues that structural flaws in the institutional design of gatekeeping—particularly the economic dependency on issuers, short-term profit incentives, and market monopolization—have compromised the neutrality and reliability of these intermediaries. Anchored in reputational capital theory, the article proposes a multi-dimensional reform strategy to restore gatekeepers’ protective function. This includes restructuring the payment model, enhancing regulatory specialization, broadening market access, and improving transparency and whistleblower protections. By establishing a tripartite accountability framework among regulators, gatekeepers, and investors, the article offers both theoretical insights and practical recommendations to reinstate the gatekeepers’ role as a credible safeguard for market integrity and investor protection.</abstract><keywords/></article-meta></front><body/><back><ref-list><ref id="B1" content-type="article"><label>1</label><element-citation publication-type="journal"><p>Coffee Jr JC, 2006, Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance. Oxford University Press, England.</p><pub-id pub-id-type="doi"/></element-citation></ref><ref id="B2" content-type="article"><label>2</label><element-citation publication-type="journal"><p>Roychowdhury S, Srinivasan S, 2019, The Role of Gatekeepers in Capital Markets. 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